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Title: 
ǮHeidegger East and West: Philosophy as Educative Contemplationǯ 
 
Abstract: 
ǯ
widely discussed by scholars. ǯ
also become increasingly clear over recent years. In this article I argue that an important   ǯ      is relatively undeveloped, 
relates to his desire to overcome Western metaphysics, a project which invites an 
exploration of his connections with Eastern thought. I argue that Heideggerǯ desire to 
deconstruct the West implies the deconstruction of conventional views of learning 
because both aim to undercut the representational nature of thinking in order to recover 
thinking as a form of contemplation. Consequently education should not be conceived as 
the acquisition of a more or less correct mental picture, but suggests the opposite: the 
relinquishing of all images in a contemplative aporia. 
 
Keywords: 
Heidegger; Daoism; Buddhism; attention; will 
 
David Lewin is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy of Education at Liverpool Hope University.  
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
This article addresses two related questions. First, cǯ
as a form of attention to being, illuminate pedagogy?; and second, to what extent will an 
appreciation of the parallels between Heidegger and Eastern philosophy help us 
understand this form of attention to being? These questions refer to a knotted bundle of 
related questions and ideas reflecting the fact that ǯ
intimately bound up with his attempts to overcome the Western metaphysical tradition. 
We will see that this overcoming entails a cautious, even reticent, encounter with Eastern 
thought. The argument will then examine ǯd teaching, both 
of which illustrate his view of thinking, which has implications for the nature of pedagogy. 
The question of the role of the will is significant here since the complex nature of human 
willing for Heidegger has important implications for the role of will and agency in the 
processes of education. The nature of will is also of paramount significance to 
contemplative traditions where the agency of the religious subject is an ongoing question 
(Lewin 2011a). The article will conclude by arguing that the state of aporia that Heidegger 
himself hoped to achieve in his students through his Socratic approach entails, in some 
sense, the abandonment of representational metaphysics. 
The literature exploring the resonances between Heidegger and Eastern thought 
is large. There is also a significant literature which seeks to demonstrate the relevance of ǯpedagogy. This paper is something of a synthesis between the 
two, though with a specific thesis concerning the deconstruction of Western thought. This 
paper does not pretend, then, to give a fulsome account of a range of Heideggerian 
concepts, or a detailed analysis of its relation to Eastern thought but is necessarily rather 
wider in its perspective. The aim is to Ǯcatch ǯthe resonances found in this interdisciplinary domain. 
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Overcoming the West 
 
Heidegger is well known as a critic of the modern world. Running through ǯ
oeuvre one finds a distinct skepticism towards the direction of Western thought 
particularly since Descartes. The modern epistemological project in which truth is 
understood as obtaining a correct representation of the world, is subject to relentless 
Heideggerian deconstruction because it presents modern science and technology as the 
dominant, if not exclusive, manner in which beings come to presence. This becomes a 
particular problem, so Heidegger believes, because human beings have lost touch with 
the question of being and have become content to inhabit a world that yields to ǯ. The result is that philosophy and metaphysics have come to 
an endǤǡǮǯǤ
thinking is not straightforward; thinking is quite distinct from general senses of cogitation 
or having a more or less correct mental image, and is a key term that we will explore in 
detail later on.  
Despite his critical stance and his efforts to secure a radical break from tradition, ǯthought. ǯhief influences were 
the ancient Greeks, the scholastic theological tradition, German idealism, and 
phenomenology. Still, any consideration of his relationship to the history of Western 
thought should take account of the claim that his rejection of philosophy in favour of Ǯǯ himself. 
Does this central aim, the overcoming of metaphysics, in its attempt to go beyond the 
specifically Western tradition, suggest an encounter with Eastern thought? There are 
several reasons to think it could.  ǯ     is considerable, and has enjoyed 
significant attention over recent decades (see for example: Caputo 1978; Ma 2007; May 
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1996; Parkes 1990). In 1922 he made the acquaintance of the distinguished Japanese 
philosopher Tanabe Hajime, and subsequently became acquainted with three other major 
thinkers from Japan: Miki Kiyoshi, Kuki Shuzo, and Nishitani Keiji. Graham Parkes argues 
that Heidegger was able to discuss East Asian thought at a sophisticated level with these 
thinkers (May 1996, Introduction). In the summer of 1946 he invited a Chinese friend, 
Paul Shih-yi Hsiao, to collaborate on a German translation of the Dao De Jing, during which 
time they managed to translate only the first eight chapters (Hsiao 1990). Chung-yuan 
Chang ǡǲ
intellectually understands but has intuitively grasped Taoist thoughtǳ (Chang, quoted in 
May 1996, p. 6; see also Chang 1970). Many commentators have made thematic parallels 
between Heidegger and DǡǯǮǯǮǯȋgelassenheit) and with the Daoist doctrines of the way (dao) 
and of non-doing (wu wei) (see for example Pöggeler 1990; Stambaugh 1990; May 1996; 
Zhang 1993; Chang 1970; Yao 1993). The action of inaction, a rough translation of wu wei, 
is concerned with letting human beings into a proper relatedness with the world that 
seems analogous, for example, ǯimage of the cabinetmaker who works with 
the shapes slumbering within the wood (Heidegger 1968, pp. 45-46). While the attempt 
to find such parallels can be fruitful, we must take care that the conclusions are not 
overdrawn, since some scholars appear to be overeager. As Ma tellingly points out, ǲȏȐhere seems to be a competition between scholars who ascribe greater similarities 
between Zen Buddhism and Heidegger and those who find more similarities between 
Daoism and Heidegger. In recent years, the latter have come to dǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ
15).  
David Storey has recently ǯ
lend themselves to comparison with Zen Buddhism and Daoism, dimensions that will help 
to orient our discussion (Storey 2012). First of all, Zen Buddhism and Daoism are non-
metaphysical, resisting grand theoretical narratives about the nature of reality. 
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ǯvery much concerned with resisting metaphysics in this sense. Second, 
Zen and Daoism are suspicious of overly rational formulations and doctrines, being highly 
poetic in nature, something with which the later Heidegger in particular, resonates 
strongly. Third, the teachings of Zen and Daoism concern a radical transformation of the 
subject that ǲforever alters his comportment toward himself, others, and the world, not 
to provide a theoretical proof or demonstration of theses about the mind and/or the ǳȋ  ? ? ? ?ǡǤ  ? ? ?ȌǤ  
since it expresses the idea that education entails not just a conceptual repositioning, but 
a total change of being. This clearly correlates with the notion that Heidegger eschews the 
tradition of representational metaphysics in which knowledge can be exchanged, 
managed, and delivered.  
John Caputo has been influential in drawing out parallels between Heidegger and 
particularly Meister Eckhart but also showing resonance with Zen Buddhism. Caputo 
compares Eugen ǯZen in the Art of Archery, in which the student learns to release 
herself into the act of releasing the bowǡ  ǯ    
gelassenheitǤǲlets ǳǲǳ
shot. When the shot occurs of its own accord, the archer is said to be ǲ-ǳǲǳ 
and to have awakened (or stayed awake for) an enlightened ǲǳȋ-mind).1 
Here, in a cautious and preliminary way, we can only scratch the surface of the similarities 
between Heidegger and Eastern philosophy and will elaborate more in due course, yet 
already we can find connections not only in the conception of a kind of thinking as 
releasement, but also of the emptiness of self, ego, or direct agency entailed in the 
experience of this kind of thinking. 
                                                        
1 Caputo uses the Sanskrit term Sunyata to refer to the void or emptiness and goes on to draw 
FRPSDULVRQVEHWZHHQWKLVFRQFHSWDQG+HLGHJJHU¶VWKRXJKW,QXVLQJWKLVWHUP&DSXWRLVGUDZLQJRQ
the work of D. T. Suzuki as well as Herrigel. In this paper I have employed the terms that are 
developed in the comparative literature. Sunyata is used in Buddhism in a variety of contexts and 
senses, though it is generally translated as emptiness, void, openness or vacuity. In Theravadan 
Buddhism in particular, it refers to the non-self (Sansrkit: anatman) and can also refer to states of 
meditation and experience.  
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Given the aforementioned parallels, it is strange that Heidegger remained 
virtually silent about Eastern thought for most of his career, especially in view of the fact ǡ ǲ has been a great deal of evidence that Heidegger gladly acknowledged to 
visitors the closeness of his thinking to the Taoist tradition and Zen Buddhismǳ (Pöggeler 
1990, p. 49).        ? ? ? ?ǯǡ     
consideration of East Asian ideas, stimulated by a visit in 1954 from a Japanese professor  
 ǡ  Ǥ ǯ A Dialogue on Language (Heidegger 
1971) represents the only instance of Heidegger explicitly discussing East Asian ideas at 
any length. However, tǯ 
the kind of philosophical cosmopolitanism that looks for cross-cultural connections. The 
impulse to draw parallels between, for example, Heideggǯ Ǯǯ  and the 
Daoist understanding of Dao/way ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǡǯ
and the Buddhist conception of sunyata/emptiness (Elberfeld 2011), could result in a 
rather blunt translation of ideas that essentially reduces one to the other, leading in the 
end to a misunderstanding of both. ǡǡǯ efforts to 
fit Heidegger and Daoism togetherǣ ǲit seems that Stambaugh has unquestioningly 
identified the notion Weg of Heidegger with the dao of Daoism. This is particularly evident ǮWay (Weg, TaoȌǯǳǤ Unfortunately Ma hardly elaborates and we are left    ǯ   since to some extent the identification 
seems justified. 2  In any case, there is a general danger that we are drawn into the 
comparison of facile representations of theoretical constructions which give accounts of 
only the outer shell of the lived tradition, and as we will see, it is precisely the 
representational dimension of Western thinking which is most objectionable and in need 
of overcoming. So the question is not whether parallels exist, which they clearly do, but 
                                                        
2 ,WVHHPVWKDW0DGRHVQRWWDNHH[FHSWLRQWRWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQRI+HLGHJJHU¶V:HJZLWK'DRODWHULQKHU
ERRN0D&KDSWHU0D¶VFRQFHUQVHHPVWREHSULPDULO\DERXWWKHZD\WKDW6WDPEDXgh makes 
an overly direct connection between Weg and Tao. In other words, there is some legitimacy to this 
connection, but it must be elaborated more carefully and patiently than Stambaugh does. 
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what can we learn from drawing parallels, which is a much stickier problem. This is a 
twofold question: it asks about the nature of knowing as well as the nature of learning. 
For to know something is not simply to maintain a correct representation or mental image 
of it. Following Plato conception of theoria, Heidegger sees knowing as more 
contemplative than representational. It follows, then, that to learn something cannot be 
only to acquire a correct representation. For Heidegger Western metaphysics has become 
dominated by the development of ever more Ǯcorrectǯ and controlling representations of 
the world, and learning appears to be dominated by the transmission and acquisition of 
ever more correct representations. This correctness is no virtue. In Heideggerǯ  
correctness does not get at the essence of the thing since it remains bound to 
representational or propositional Ǯǯ
(Heidegger 1977, pp. 5-7). Do these problems with Western metaphysics suggest a turn 
to the Eastern thought?  
Heidegger does not believe that an appeal to Eastern thought is an appropriate 
move in overcoming the metaphysical tradition. In the Spiegel interview of 1966 
Heidegger famously claims that the transformation of the Western tradition cannot 
emerge: ǲthrough the adoption of Zen Buddhism or other Eastern experiences of the 
world. Rethinking requires the help of the European tradition and a reappropriation of it. 
Thinking is transformed only by thinking that has the same origin and destinyǳ (Wolin 
1993, p. 113). Here Heidegger is referring not only to the roots of Western metaphysics 
in ancient Greek thinking but also, and more obscurely, to the destiny of Western thought. 
That destiny is bound up with the crisis of technological being and enframing (Gestell), in 
which the only way of being is to see the world in terms of resources (Heidegger 1977; 
Lewin 2011a). For Heidegger the crisis of technological Gestell  has its roots in the Socratic 
conception of being (as eternal idea: eidos) since this idea renders us incapable of 
remaining open to being. The problem seems connected with the desire for fixed 
conceptual or representational understandings by elevating knowledge to the realm of 
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the ideal of formal. But in arguing that we cannot simply import a solution to this Western 
crisis from the Orient, doesǯ Heidegger rather foreclose the scope of revelation? Storey   ǯ    Ǯǯ     
represents a reification of ǲthe Westǳ (Storey 2012, p. 115). Furthermore, as Ma points ǡǲȏȐlmost all of Heideggeǯ-West dialogue appear in the 
context of a deep concern with the Ge-stellǳ (Ma 2007, p. 7). We could see Gestell as 
encapsulating the problem faced by the West for which an encounter with the East might 
offer a solution. In the Spiegel interview Heidegger famously stateǲǥ
save usǳ, a phrase which suggests our impotence and invokes a transcendent agency (in 
the sense that it escapes technological Gestell) as being capable of interrupting the 
direction of the West. ǯǮǯ

are unhelpfully conflated. So this god must escape ontotheology and must, therefore, be 
properly other, and transcendent. It is plausible that this transcendent dimension would 
find its source in an Eastern tradition which does not belong to the Indo-European 
linguistic and cultural heritage. But Heidegger is a hermeneutic philosopher who 
proceeds on the basis that our freedom is formed and structured by contextualised 
historicity (Heidegger 1996). He is, therefore, unwilling to sever the cord that attaches his 
thinking to the destiny of Western thought, even thoughǡ ǯǡ all other 
efforts to develop the metaphysical tradition - from Socrates up to and including 
Nietzsche, who for Heidegger precisely completes the Western traditionǯs movement 
towards nihilism - appear only to result in representational thinking, technological 
enframing, and ultimately nihilism. But that representational problem is what makes 
importing solutions from the East so troubling: we will inevitably import the 
representation that conforms most completely to the technological Gestell. In other words, 
we will import an image of the East and put it to use, a tendency evident in the 
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appropriation of Eastern traditions to Western patterns of consumption and spiritual 
consciousness (Carrette and King 2005). 
This direction of thinking and being has profound implications for education as 
we will see. Today we have become almost entirely inured to seeing education as the 
transmission and manipulation of more or less correct representations of the world. We 
have likewise taken for granted that education should be placed in service of global forces 
that seem to be incorporated into technological enframing. In other words, education is 
defined and justified in utilitarian terms.  However, there is still much to be said before 
the implications for education can be fully elaborated.     ǯ
understanding of thought (Denken), a notion that implies a kind of releasement 
(gelassenheit) that, as we have already noted, invites comparison with contemplative 
traditions East and West. 
 
 
Thinking as Releasement 
 
Perhaps more ǡǯDiscourse on Thinking that the idea 
of thinking as releasement is explored. The conceptual register of this term corresponds 
in tantalizing ways to ideas from contemplative traditions the world over, both East and 
West, from Shankara to Eckhart, from the Dalai Lama to Thomas Merton. But what are we 
to make of the strange juxtaposition between thinking, normally understood as referring 
to conceptions or considerations that take place in the mind, and releasement? We are 
perhaps more able to understand what thinking is not for Heidegger than to establish 
directly what thinking is. Thinking here has little to do with the kind of conceptual 
reasoning of the logician, or the internal narration that accompanies everyday life. 
Thinking is responsive, entailing an attention to being, which is why the question of 
thinking directly follows the question of being. The notion of attention is closely related.  
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Attention captures the sense of a kind of thinking that does not re-present to itself 
a mental picture, but abides in pure awareness. That pedagogy should be concerned with 
the cultivation of attention is an important idea for a number of philosophers (such as 
William James and Simone Weil) (see Lewin 2014b), and provides an interesting way of ǯ. The idea of attention also 
evokes a range of cross-cultural conceptions of awareness or contemplation, from 
Christian prayer to Buddhist meditation, and so offers a way to bring together a number 
of related ideas. But again I would advise caution here. ǯ  
releasement has a specific role in his wider philosophical concerns.  
Heideggerǯ conception of releasement begins with the analysis of the history of 
Western metaphysics as the forgetting of being and the loss of true thought. Modern 
humanity has isolated discursive reasoning or representational thought, characterized by 
modern science and philosophy (particularly in its analytic and positivist strains), as not 
only paradigmatic, but as the exclusive form of thought. This kind of calculative thinking 
has its place, but like a virulent virus, seeks to reproduce itself at the expense of all other 
forms of thinking. Taken on its own, calculative thinking is in danger of ascribing truth 
and reality only to that which can be defined and measured scientifically. As Caputo puts ǡǲȏȐe are rapidly coming to believe that the only form of truth is the truth which the 
mathematical sciences establish, and that such science is the only legitimate form of 
thinkingǳ (Caputo 1978, p. 264). ǯdescribed 
in a variety of ways: meditative thinking, reflecting, releasing, letting-be, shepherding 
being, and coming into the clearing. In the Discourse on Thinking ǡǲ
can follow the path of meditative thinking in his own manner and within his own limits. 
Why? Because man is a thinking, that is, a ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ? ?ȌǤ
does Heidegger mean by meditative thought, and can it legitimately be related to the 
contemplative traditions of the East? Is this thinking evocative of a contemplative, 
meditative, or mystical state?  
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Caputo argues that since Heidegger steps back from philosophy and metaphysics 
that thinking takes on more of a likeness to that which lies beyond philosophy; namely   Ǥ         ǯ 
course The Principle of Reasonǡǲ  ǳ (Caputo 1978, p. 6).3 There 
does seem to be a close proximity between thinking and poetry, or perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that poetry offers a language and a form in which thinking can take place 
(See Heidegger 1976, p. 20)Ǥ     ǯ  ǡ   s 
encounter with the poetry of Hölderlin, Rilke, and Trakl, and the somewhat poetic form 
that ǯ   , draws attention to language that affords the 
opportunity to encounter language itself. But is this poetic turn a kind of mysticism of 
language? Heidegger is cautious about connecting his thinking with mysticism, explicitly 
denying that his thinking entails any kind of spiritual or mystical state of experience, 
always orienting the reader back to beingǣ ǲ ȋ   ǣ
thinking) is nothing mystical, not an act of illumination, but rather the entry into dwelling ǳȋHeidegger 1972, p. 53). With the notable exception of Wittgenstein Ǯǯ, which owes a great deal to the 
influence of Heidegger (see Janicaud 2000), skepticism towards the mystical, with its 
connotation of mystification and experientialism, has been commonplace across post-
Enlightenment philosophy. For Heidegger there is the additional problem that the 
Western theological tradition has had a tendency towards ontotheology, the identification 
of God as the ground of being and the ground of creatures. There is, then, a danger that 
thinking gets entangled here with another representation, this time of mystical 
experience. So while thinking is not easily defined, Heidegger wants us to see it in terms 
of appropriation: a mutual appropriation between human beings and the world, where 
                                                        
3 Familiarity with the original context, and the care with which Heidegger chooses his words will make 
&DSXWR¶VXVHRIWKHTXRWDWLRQVHHPquestionable+HLGHJJHUSUHFHGHVWKLVTXRWHZLWKWKHZRUGV³RQHLV
inclined to get the idea´+HLGHJJHUFS, suggesting in fact a quite different interpretation. 
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attention unfolds into presence. Thinking does not take us away from being, as certain 
forms of meditative practice which call for the end of thought might suppose, rather 
thinking is the ground and possibility of such practices. Hence Heidegger develops ǯ (Heidegger 1976). I now turn to ǯǡdistinctive pedagogical strategy that has 
both rhetorical and substantive significance. 
 
 
ǯ 
 
Heideggerǯ way of thinking suggests an openness to being which appropriates attention. 
Particularly in What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger draws attention to attention. There is 
as much performative as propositional significance to this since Heidegger is concerned 
with engaging the attention of the reader directly. By this I mean that reading Heidegger 
is a form of inquiry that should result in an encounter with the text, going beyond 
understanding in the representational sense of the word (a clear picture which I could, for 
example, explain to another).  Can we go as far as to call reading Heidegger a 
contemplative act? ǯ      ǡ
demanding fresh attention to what may previously have appeared to be simple, or settled 
philosophical ideas.4 It is almost as if what is being said is less important than how it is 
being said. George ǡǲǮǯǯǤǮǡǯn acceptance of felt strangenessǳ (Steiner 1992, 
p. 11). This experiencing can be realized through the artful writing of the philosopher-
poet. Steiner says, 
 
                                                        
4  What might be called +HLGHJJHU¶V PHWKRG LQ PXFK RI KLV ZRUN LV FRQVLVWHQW KH EHJLQV ZLWK D
characterization of the everyday sense of a term, or the conventional view of an idea (philosophy; 
WHFKQRORJ\WUXWKODQJXDJHDUW«ZKLFKLVLPPHGLDWHO\GHFRQVWructed. 
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ǯ   ǡ      - so 
contrastive with the German idealist philosophy from Kant to Schopenhauer - in ǮǯǮǯ
idiom. We are to be slowed down, bewildered and barred in our reading so that 
we may be driven deep (Steiner 1992, p. 8). 
 
For the most part, our habits of reading and thinking precede us. We tend to read without 
care, and think what is given us to think through the structures of being that precede our 
existence. Thus Heidegger wants to break the spell of the idle talk that philosophy has 
fallen into. This requires, to some extent, a new idiom in which words are allowed to speak 
afresh, through which the strangeness of being can again be felt. We might be tempted to 
seek that new idiom in the language of Eastern wisdom traditions. But this is only possible 
where those traditions have not been appropriated by Western representational 
metaphysics: where we do not read Eastern traditions through the reductive lens of, for 
example, a Ǯbelief systemǯ  Ǯ-ǯ.5 It is the conquest of the other in terms of 
subjective representation that characterizes the culmination of Western metaphysics and 
is the danger of cross-cultural analysis. In his reading of Heidegger, Michael Peters draws 
attention to the relation between subjectivity and representation where he says, ǲ
                                                        
5 )URP+HLGHJJHU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZQRRQHKROGVDZRUOGYLHZVWLOOOHVVDEHOLHIV\VWHP+HLGHJJHU¶VHVVD\
µ7KH$JHRIWKH:RUOG3LFWXUH¶+HLGHJJHUSS-154) gives an indication of the predicament of 
the modern West which regards cultures in terms of cultural representations. The point here has 
implications for any wider cross-cultural comparison. That we see other cultures in terms of world views 
demonstrates only that we have a representational conception of lived experience. It is worth quoting 
+HLGHJJHUDWOHQJWK³As soon as the world becomes picture, the position of man is conceived as a world 
view. To be sure, the phrase "world view" is open to misunderstanding, as though it were merely a matter 
here of a passive contemplation of the world. For this reason, already in the nineteenth century it was 
emphasized with justification that "world view" also meant and even meant primarily "view of life." The 
fact that, despite this, the phrase "world view" asserts itself as the name for the position of man in the 
midst of all that is, is proof of how decisively the world became picture as soon as man brought his life 
as subiectum into precedence over other centers of relationship. This means: whatever is, is considered 
to be in being only to the degree and to the extent that it is taken into and referred back to this life, i.e., 
is lived out, and becomes life-experience. Just as unsuited to the Greek spirit as every humanism had to 
be, just so impossible was a medieval world view, and just as absurd is a Catholic world view. Just as 
necessarily and legitimately as everything must change into life­experience for modern man the more 
unlimitedly he takes charge of the shaping of his essence, just so certainly could the Greeks at the 
Olympian festivals never have had life-H[SHULHQFHV´+HLGHJJHUS-134). 
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Ǯǯsubjectum is part and parcel of the same  ǳ ȋ  ? ? ? ?ǡ Ǥ  ?Ȍ, a metaphysical process rooted in the 
conception of truth as representational accuracy. Peters goes on to quote from ǯessay Ǯǯǣ 
 
The fundamental event of the modern age is the conquest of the world as picture. 
The word ǲpictureǳ [Bild] now means the structured image [Gebild] that is the ǯwhich represents and sets before. In such producing, 
man contends for the position in which he can be that particular being who gives 
the measure and draws up the guidelines for everything that is (Heidegger 1977 
in Peters 2002, p. 8). 
 
The temptation towards easy and lazy syncretism, the natural expression of 
representational thinking, is great, and often the result is not a true encounter, dialogue 
or reconciliation, but a projection of the known over the unknown where neither is 
illuminated. The mind that engages only in representational thinking struggles to dwell 
with the unknown, not having the patienǯǮǯ 
Sharon Todd in her article within this issue.  
It is not, of course, that the wisdom of the East is intrinsically lacking, but rather 
that our representation will always conceal more than it reveals. So for Heidegger the 
Western tradition from Plato up to and including Nietzsche has, in different ways, 
prioritised representational thinking at the expense of the more contemplative modes 
that might correspond to attentive reading. This is the predicament of Western 
metaphysics that Heidegger is attempting to overcome. It is a metaphysical tradition that 
seeks to represent presence rather than let what is come into presence. In contrast to the 
modern conception of truth as correct correspondence between the representation and 
the world, Heidegger understands truth as aletheia (unconcealment): this entails the 
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event of letting what is come into presence. As we shall see, this letting has particular 
significance for pedagogy since the educator depends upon the work of being to come into 
appearance; being itself has the pedagogical initiative.     ǯ Through Phenomenology to Thought, Heidegger 
indicates that what holds for ontology generally, also holds for efforts to make his 
philosophy accessible by way of secondary literature: ǲvery effort to bring what has been 
thought closer to prevailing modes of (re)presentation must assimilate what-is-to-be-
thought to those (re)presentations and thereby inevitably deform the matterǳ 
(Richardson 2003, p. viii). In other words, the secondary representation of thinking 
occludes the encounter. Heidegger is critical of much secondary literature in philosophy 
and seeks instead a kind of thinking which does not rely on representation; seeking, in 
other words, a kind of unmediated experience predicated on a kind of attention. This 
conception of thinking suggests a philosophy of education that would question both 
teaching as an act of mediation between the world and the student, and learning as the 
process by which the student acquires and refines a representation in the mind. In the 
end, the teacher must let the encounter between the student and the world take place by 
withdrawing herself. To teach is to draw attention to world and then, in a sense, the 
learning is between the world and the student. It is not enough for the student to have a 
correct representation of the world that they bring, for example, to the exam hall. For 
Heidegger, eǮǯ that it must reach 
all the way down (Heidegger 1998; Thomson 2002).  
But is this paper not attempting to mediate Heidegger through a more or less 
correct representation? The attentive reader may be aware of an ongoing dilemma: how 
do we read Ǯaboutǯ Heidegger without his ideas being represented and thereby deformed? 
Can the secondary author simply Ǯǯ Ǯ toǯ what is to be 
thought? Can this drawing of attention bring academic discourse into the realm of a 
language that bears witness, that is, the poetic? Journal articles are not normally read in 
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the way poetry is read (it is, perhaps, inaccurate to speak of one Ǯǯ Ȃ 
or indeed journal articles!). We are left wondering whether the academic discussion of 
Heidegger will inevitably fall into the kind of representational thinking that he always 
sought to overcome. But is this concern predicated on too stark a dichotomy? Are we in 
danger of opposing the poetic with the philosophical (or academic)? In the lecture course 
Parmenides, for example, Heidegger himself suggests that mythos and logos are too readily 
placed in opposition (Heidegger 1992, p. 6). What do these tensions mean for pedagogy? 
Although these tensions are never fully resolved Ȃ indeed their presence can perform the 
creative function of continually drawing our attention back from the settled philosophical 
position Ȃ Hǯ instructive. 
Some of ǯ are particularly relevant to pedagogy in 
that they demonstrate the process of thinking the difference between being and 
representation. In his opening remarks on Úǯ hymn Der Ister, Heidegger says, 
 
We must first become attentive to this poetry. Once we have become attentive, we   ǲ  ǡǳ  ǡ ǡ   ǡ  ǡ ǲǡǳ  ǡ
might be said in the word of this poet (Heidegger 1996, p. 1). 
 
To discover what is said in the word of the poet seems to require a double-movement of 
attention, hence the circuitous, or paradoxical, manner in which attention is possible only 
after we have become attentive. An orientation of attentiveness (which is not directly 
controlled by the will) is the precondition of paying attention as an action of will. But it is 
more complicated than this. The orientation of attentiveness is indeed not entirely 
outside the domain of human willing since we can conceivably work upon our orientation 
by, for example, creating a space in which distractions are minimized. Conversely even Ǯǯ
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of a clear agent engaged in straightforward action. Heidegger goes on to reflect on the 
nature of interpreting poetry. Why is poetry in need of interpretation? Does 
interpretation help us behold the poetic word, or does it merely mediate and represent? 
Are we transported into the ǲdwelling placeǳ of the poetic, or is the poetic word structured, 
interpreted, and domesticated into the digestable curricula and schemes of work 
appropriate to measurable educational outcomes? Does the positioning of the poem into 
an educational syllabus represent the enframing or imprisoning of the poetic word? Is 
this not the death of poetry? Heidegger is ambivalent about his own relationship (as 
teacher and philosopher) to the word of the poetǣ ǲ       Úǯ poetry, the remarks merely provide a few markers, signs that call our ǡǤǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ?Ȍǯǣ
be an accompaniment that draws attention through markers and signs, to open spaces for 
reflection. Any other more explicative move would not teach through a kind of bearing 
witness, but would represent and thereby deface or replace. Similar to Jacototǯ
emancipatory method in The Ignorant Schoolmaster (Ranciere 1991), the task of teaching 
for Heidegger is not explication since that entails representational thinking. There is a ǡ         ǯ 
evokes. 
In attempting to understand how Heidegger can contribute to educational 
thinking we must also consider why it is that Heidegger relied primarily on the spoken 
word. The priority of dialogue goes some way to explain why most of his published 
writings were originally lecture courses        ǲ
thinǳȋHeidegger 1968, p. 17). ǯPhaedrus, speech has tended 
to be prioritised over writing for its ability to remain literally in dialogue. Writing, in 
contrast, fixes the discourse to a particular representation, a process that is 
philosophically and pedagogically significant. Ǯǯ
by giving his students a strong command of the facts, or considerations to be made, still 
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less by establishing the correct interpretations of ideas or texts, but rather by showing a 
certain way of relating to the subject matter. For Heidegger this requires the teacher to be ǲrenticesǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ? ?ȌǤ
could see for themselves an approach to thinking taking place that his students could Ǥǯare best appreciated as a ǲǳǡǤWe could go further and say that 
Heidegger himself is on the way to thought and that Ǯpath of ǯǣ ǲȏȐet us also in the days ahead remain as wanderers on the way into the 
neighbourhood of Beingǳ (Heidegger 1993, p. 224).  ǡ   ǯ
students, writes: 
 
Those who know Martin Heidegger only through his published writings can 
hardly form an idea of his unique style of teaching. Even with beginners, he was 
able in no time to coax them into thinking, not just learning various views or 
reproducing what they had read, but entering into the movement of thinking. It 
seemed as if by some miracle the Socratic practice of address and rejoinder had 
come to life again (Biemel 1977, p. 7).  
 
This brings us again to the understanding of thinking as a kind of attention that leaves 
behind representations and in which being is let into its own nature. This is a thinking 
that can only occur at Ǯthe end of philosophyǯ.  ? ? ? ?ǲȋȌǡǡǳ 
(Heidegger 1973, p. 96). Elsewhere Heidegger says, ǲǮǤǯǫthey were the greatest thinkersǳ (Heidegger 1956, 
p. 52-53). Philosophy as it has come to be practised in the modern West has little to do 
with thought. Part and parcel with the representational nature of Western thought is the Ǯǯǡ basically equivalent to Western 
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ǮǯǮǯǤrational grounds or 
reasons and argumentation, but it is this effort to find Ǯǯ
contrasts with real thinking. Caputo shows how Heidegger perceives the problematic 
nature of providing reasons (rationen reddere): 
 
Many major philosophers in the past - Descartes, Kant, Fichte, Husserl, 
Wittgenstein - ǲǳ
finally discovered what philosophy truly is (...) They each proposed the definitive 
way to give an account (rationem reddere) of things in philosophy. But ǯȋǤǤǤȌǯ
a call to leave the domain of rational argumentationȄthe sphere of ratioȄbehind 
(...) Heidegger calls for a leap beyond the realm of giving reasons in order to take 
up a non-conceptual, non-discursive, non-   ǲǳ
which is profoundly divided from any of the traditional varieties of philosophy 
(Caputo 1978, p. 3-4).  
 
Compare this disavowal of the conceptual and discursive, with, for example, the warnings 
expressed by the 2nd/3rd century Buddhist Nagarjuna about conceiving of truth in reified 
or conceptual terms. This is one well-known expression of suspicion towards conceptual 
reasoning and associated essentialism in Buddhist thought. David Storey has argued that ǯ-ǯ
later thought (Storey 2012, pp. 122-127). 
As we have seen, ǯunderstanding of thinking is complex and must be 
separated from a range of ideas conventionally associated with the term (conceptualising; 
representation; calculative thought; providing rational grounds). Heidegger wants us to ǲǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ?Ȍǡ he 
wants to retain the term in part for etymological reasons; Denken shares an etymological 
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root with Danken (to thank) (Heidegger 1968, p. 138 ff.). That thinking might entail an 
orientation of thankfulness encourages a realisation that thinking is not something we 
simply determine through a matter of will but comes to us as something of a gift. After all, 
what occurs to us is often not directly up to us. This attenuation of agency brings us to the 
deconstruction of the willful self. 
 
 
The deconstruction of the willful self 
 
We have seen that ǯ fundamentally about the call to 
attend to being, and we have related this way of being attentive to a form of pedagogy. ǯ characterised as a kind of gathering of attention that acts in 
a participative way to let being come into appearance. To be attentive is, therefore, to 
respond to the call of being. This raises questions of identity and agency since this 
responsiveness involves a self whose agency is not absolute. Elsewhere I have argued that 
Heidegǯ
agency is neither fully active nor passive (Lewin 2011b). In modern metaphysics this 
conception of the self, founded on Cartesian and Kantian philosophy, has been constituted 
as a stable ego identity: the ideal rational subject whose sovereign will is autonomous. 
For Heidegger this subject is an expression of representational metaphysics since only a 
representation can confer the total power to the subject. The fact that this subject is 
linguistically subverted in Heideggerǯoffers an opportunity to 
relate Heidegger to the contemplative elements of Eastern traditions in, for example, the 
negative dialectics of Nagarjuna. We have noted a connection with the self-less art of 
archery in Zen Buddhism and have seen that paying attention to the word of the poet 
entails an attenuation of the voluntarist conception of the will. The transcendence or 
negation of the substance both of being and of self is an important theme within the 
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meditative practices of Buddhism and Daoism. In Daoist thinking, we see not so much a 
negation of substance and self as the non-duality of the self and Dao. This suggests a 
spiritual life that yields the power and dominance of the autonomous subject in favour of 
a harmonious immanence with the world. An important theme within Daoism is the way 
in which the will is in harmony with the world whereby action is effortless in wu wei. Each 
tradition has its specific forms of spiritual practice but there are broad themes that are 
consistent to do with a realization (and the non-representational nature of this realization 
is of critical importance) that the illusion of the individual and autonomous self must be 
attenuated or abandoned. Caputo draws similar parallels here between Zen Buddhism, 
Eckhart and Heidegger: 
 
In Zen, when the self has become entirely egoless and will-less, it is admitted into 
"satori." In Heidegger, Dasein is admitted into the truth of Being, the "event of 
appropriation." Thus, to satori, the state of "enlightenment," we relate the 
"lighting" (lichten) process of the "clearing" (Lichtung) which is made in Dasein 
for the event of truth. In and through this "event," Dasein enters into its own most 
essential being (Wesen), even as the soul enters into its innermost ground 
(Seelengrund; Eckhart) and the self in Zen is awakened to its "Buddha-nature" or 
"self-nature" (Caputo 1978, p. 214). 
 
Like the contemplative traditions of Buddhism and Daoism, knowledge arises from (at 
least in part) a deconstruction of the self and the will. The refinement of human will is 
explored by Heidegger in many places, for example his Conversation on a Country Path 
about Thinking (Heidegger 1970), in which he presents a fictional dialogue on the nature 
of thinking, and indicates a turn to meditative rather than calculative thinking. I argue 
that the form of the conversation can evoke an aporia in the reader which enacts the 
philosophical point. It can bring the reader to the kind of thinking and attention that I 
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argued earlier was important to Heideggerǯ way. In other words, the conversation both 
shows and says. For many spiritual practices, the relation between the will, subjectivity 
and spiritual practice, entails a complexity and ambiguity that is shared by Heideggeǯ
conception of thinking. For this reason, one of the first questions that occurs in the 
conversation is about the nature of the will: whether non-willing is a will to not will or an 
attempt to remain absolutely outside the domain of the will. There would seem to be the Ǯǯǡs us 
back: 
 
Scholar: So far as we can wean ourselves from willing, we contribute to the 
awakening of releasement. 
Teacher: Say rather, keeping awake for releasement. 
Scholar: Why not, to the awakening? 
Teacher: Because on our own we do not awaken releasement in ourselves 
(Heidegger 1970, p. 60-61) 
 
The strategy of negation here resonates with the teaching practices of the Zen master: ǲǡHeidegger does not tell us what to do, only what not to do. And in 
response to the natural question complaining of the resulting disorientation, he ǡǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ
p. 535). This is one explanation for the aporia of the dialogue. But still we want to know 
who or what can awaken releasement in us? Beyond the aporetic, there is a logical 
problem which our general conception of agency forces on us: the binary logic that we are 
either active or passive. But Heidegger is pointing to the idea that agency is both present 
and absent. A higher acting, which is yet not activity, is required and is, therefore, beyond 
the distinction between activity and passivity. This acting has already been evoked as the 
Daoist conception of wu wei. Yet, a    ȋ Ǯǯ Ȍ often 
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remains within the domain of the will, if, for example, it attains to a divine will. Although 
Heidegger adopts the term gelassenheit from his reading of Eckhart (see Hackett 2012, pp. 
687ff.), he seems to regard Eckhartǯs still within the domain 
of this submission to divine will and so cannot fully assent to it (Heidegger 1970, p. 62).6 
In this conversation it is made plain that releasement cannot be represented to the mind, 
but it becomes less clear what the interlocutors Ǯǯlearn a thinking that 
is a releasement. So the teacher says: ǲǳ (Heidegger 1970, p. 
62). And though they know not what they wait for, they must learn to wait if they are to 
learn thinking. Again the contemplative mood evoked in the dialogue is (to use a 
Wittgensteinian characterisation) both shown and said. Heidegger both brings the 
questions to presence and enacts the philosophical points. The interlocutors are hoping 
to learn what releasement means though the agency of teaching and learning is similarly 
in question. Who teaches and who learns in the dialogue is complex and shifting, giving 
the reader a sense that the subjective agent cannot maintain a grip on the movement of 
the dialogue and must enter into an unstable movement. 
The idea of attention likewise entails an attenuation of the will. We spoke earlier 
of ǯ evocation of poetry as a double-movement between the orientation of 
attentiveness that precedes and structures the possibility of the act of letting attention 
into itself. This shifting and ambiguous notion of agency has left Heidegger open to the 
charge that he equivocates on his philosophical (and political) commitments; that, for 
example, the destiny of technological thinking is paradoxically both determining us, and 
determined by us, leaving no clear statement of what is to be (or indeed can be) done 
(Heidegger, 1977). We are brought to an aporia, left without a clear method of approach 
                                                        
6 Pöggeler argues that this understanding of Eckhart might apply to the pedagogical discourses where the 
traditional religious language still very much persists (Pöggeler 1990). But Eckhart as the non-dualist, 
where the ground of the soul and the Godhead are one, would seem to accord with a releasement beyond 
the domain of the will altogether &DSXWR VXJJHVWV WKDW +HLGHJJHU¶V PLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI (FNKDUW¶V
releasement results from the fact that +HLGHJJHUVXSSRVHV(FNKDUW¶VUHOHDVHPHQWWREHDZLOOLQJWRQRW
will, and as such, to be an ethical and moral category (Caputo 1978, pp. 180f). 
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to the problems of our age. ǯ
to deconstruct the subject of Western metaphysics that found its apex in the Cartesian 
cogito and the Kantian autonomous will. This equivocation is not a failure but a feature of 
Heideggerian thinking. So I suggest the same equivocation would be detected were we to 
seek a stable Heideggerian doctrine of attention. Any such doctrine of attention would 
itself be prone to the representational metaphysics of the modern age.  
Could it be that the recent interest in mindfulness in education, in which 
mindfulness is employed for managing anxiety and behaviour to improve educational 
outcomes, depends on just such a doctrine of attention? I suggest that for Heidegger the 
current interest in mindfulness would represent a concealment of the essence of attention 
and precisely the oblivion to being that needs to be overcome. This is because the 
representation of attention-management as a method to harness the contemplative 
power of the mind is a product of a technology of the self in which the self is managed 
within an enframed totality of control. It entails a representation of happiness and the 
good life that conceals the complex and circuitous nature of being-in-the-world and 
supposes that Dasein can be circumscribed and satisfied by a representation of happiness.  
I have tried to suggest that Heidegger's understanding of agency is not 
incidentally related to the nature of attention but centrally so. I have also wanted to ǯǡǡ Ǥ ǯ philosophical movement can be interpreted as an elaboration of the nature  ǡ         ǯ ng-in-the-world 
(Heidegger, 1996), of thinking as thanking (Heidegger, 1976) and the meditative thinking 
of his Discourse on Thinking ȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǮǯ
Letter on Humanism (Heidegger, 1993); the complex double-movement of attention 
mirrors the complex double-nature of identity itself because attention is significantly Ǥǯ
onto itself: i.e. as attention. We could take this further if we consider how language 
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constitutes Being and human being. In a certain sense, all speech grants the world in terms 
of structuring our orientation to it, and so speech intimates the tripartite gathering of 
aletheia which involves Being, Dasein, and mediation (See Lewin 2014b). This is because ǡǡǡǲ-concealing ǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ? ? ?ȌǤ
condition for speaking, namely being,  ǯ    
beyond my present scope. 
From the perspective of the desire   ǯ  within a 
philosophical history it might seem natural to ask again, what does Heidegger mean by 
thinking? One reading of Heidegger could suggest that attention is the essence of thinking. 
But this answer elides the dynamic character of thinking as attention and, in fact, the 
tendency to want to project Ǯǯseems itself 
to emerge from a Ǯ  ǯ , so Heidegger argues, places us in the state of 
inattention (or oblivion of being). The ready answer may have the ring of correctness to 
it, but that doǮǯ since it functions not to draw attention out but rather 
to stifle attention. ǲǲ-ǳǳȋ
1978, p. 24), will the still voice of the truth of Being be heard. The task of thinking then is ǲǡǡǡ
never able to think - ǳȋ ? ? ? ?ǡǤ ? ?ȌǤ
overcome metaphysics, Heidegger has distinguished ǲ ǳ from ǲǳǣ representational thinking as the metaphysical method, and essential     ǲ ǳ      Ǥ   ǡ 
sciences and traditional philosophy, indeed metaphysics as a whole, involve a mode of ǲǳ ȋVorstellenȌ  ǲǳ ȋHerstellen) beings which necessarily 
conceals the Truth of Being. To know the difference is one mark of the educated person: 
the person who has learnt to wait for being to show itself. 
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Conclusion 
 
I have only been able to indicate some of the resonances between Heidegger and Eastern 
traditions in this paper. ǯ
to doing philosophy is indicative of a philosophical and pedagogical view that has 
generally gone unrecognized. What dominates pedagogy today is the construction, 
transmission, and refinement of mental representations. For Heidegger this is not Ǥ ǯ     deavor of reducing students to 
aporia in which it is the representations that must be abandoned to the appropriation of 
being (Allen and Axiotis 2002, p. 16). The student must abandon all images if they are to 
let themselves be reduced to the aporia that is an essential moment in education. Thus ǯ  of thinking entails an equally radical and profound 
reconceptualization of education. A comparison with Eastern traditions does offer, I think, 
some important opportunities to see this reconceptualization at work. This is because to 
learn from a Zen Buddhist master, for example, does not only entail a correct 
understanding of Zen doctrine Ȃ that we have associated with representational thinking - 
but also involves a more complete change of perspective that forms the ground of ǮǯǤ This total shift is ontological/epistemological (a distinction between the two is 
difficult to maintain here) and resonates ǯ view of education.  
 
 
References 
 27 
$//(19$/(5,(DQG$;,27,6$5(6µ+HLGHJJHURQWKH$UWRI7HDFKLQJ¶LQ
in Peters (ed.) Heidegger, Education, and Modernity (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield) 
pp. 1-20. 
BIEMEL, WALTER (1977) Martin Heidegger, trans. J. L. Mehta (London: Routledge) 
CAPUTO, JOHN (1978) 7KH 0\VWLFDO (OHPHQW LQ +HLGHJJHU¶V 7KRXJKW (Fordham 
University Press) 
CARRETTE, JEREMY; and KING, RICHARD (2005) Selling Spirituality: The Silent 
Takeover of Religion (London: Routledge) 
CHANG, CHUNG-<8$1 µCommentary on J. Glenn Gra\¶V ³6SOHQGRXURI WKH
VLPSOH´¶Philosophy East and West 20:3, 241-246. 
DAVIS, BRET (2007) Heidegger on the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit (Evanston 
IL, Northwestern University Press) 
DAVIS, BRET; SCHRODER, BRIAN; and WIRTH, JASON, (2011) (eds.) Japanese 
and Continental Philosophy: Conversations with the Kyoto School (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press). 
ELBERFELD, ROLF (2011) µThe Middle Voice of EPSWLQHVV1LVKLGDDQG1LVKLWDQL¶LQ
Davis, B., Schroeder, B., and Wirth, J., (eds.) Japanese and Continental Philosophy: 
Conversations with the Kyoto School (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 269-
285. 
HACKETT, JEREMIAH (2012) (ed.) A Companion to Eckhart (Leiden: Brill). 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1956) What is Philosophy? trans. J. Wilde and W. Kluback  
(New Haven, College and University Press). 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1970) Discourse on Thinking trans. J. Anderson and E. 
Freund (New York NY, Harper and Row). 
 28 
+(,'(**(50$57,1µA Dialogue on Language - between a Japanese and 
an Inquirer¶, in On the Way To Language, (New York, Harper and Row). 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1972) On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press) 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1973) The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New 
York, Harper and Row) 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1976) What is Called Thinking? Trans. J. Gray (New York NY, 
Harper and Row). 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1977) The Question Concerning Technology and Other 
Essays, trans. W. Lovitt (New York NY, Harper and Row). 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1992) Parmenides, trans. A. Schuwer and R. Rojcewicz 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press). 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1993) Basic Writings: Second Edition, Revised and Expanded 
(New York NY, HarperCollins). 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1996a) Being and Time: A Translation of Sein and Zeit, trans. 
J. Stambaugh (Albany NY, State University of New York Press) 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1996b) +|OGHUOLQ¶V+\PQµ7KH,VWHU¶, trans. W. McNeill and J. 
Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press). 
HEIDEGGER, MARTIN (1996c) The Principle of Reason, trans. R. Lilly (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press). 
+(,'(**(50$57,1µ3ODWR¶V'RFWULQHRI7UXWK¶LQPathmarks, McNeill (ed.) 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 155-182. 
 29 
HSIAO, PAUL SHIH-<,µ+HLGHJJHUDQG2XU7UDQVODWLRQRIWKH7DR7H &KLQJ¶LQ
Parkes (ed.) Heidegger and Asian Thought, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 
93-104. 
KREEFT, PETER (1977) µ=HQLQ+HLGHJJHU¶V*HODVVHQKHLW¶International Philosophical 
Quarterly 11: 4, 521-545. 
LEWIN, DAVID (2011a) Technology and the Philosophy of Religion (Newcastle Upon 
Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing). 
LEWIN, DAVID (2011b) 'The Middle Voice in Eckhart and Modern Continental 
Philosophy' Medieval Mystical Theology 20: 1, 28-46. 
/(:,1'$9,'Dµ7KH/HDSRI/HDUQLQJ¶Ethics and Education 9: 1, 113-126. 
/(:,1 '$9,' E µ%HKROG 6LOHQFH DQG $WWHQWLRQ LQ (GXFDWLRQ¶ Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 48: 3, 355-369. 
MA, LIN (2007) Heidegger on East-West Dialogue: Anticipating the Event (London: 
Routledge). 
MAY, REINHARD (1996) +HLGHJJHU¶V+LGGHQ6RXUFHV(DVW$VLDQ,QIOXHQFHVRQKLV
Work, trans G. Parkes (London: Routledge). 
PARKES, GRAHAM (1990) Heidegger and Asian Thought (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press). 
PETERS, MICHAEL (2002) (ed.) Heidegger, Education, and Modernity (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield). 
PÖ**(/(52772µ:HVW-East Dialogue: Heidegger and Lao-7]X¶LQ3DUNHV
(ed.) Heidegger and Asian Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 47-78. 
 30 
RANCIERE, JACQUES (1991) The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in 
Intellectual Emancipation, trans. Kristin Ross (Stanford: Stanford University Press) 
RICHARDSON, WILLIAM (2003) Through Phenomenology to Thought (New York: 
Fordham University Press) 
STAMBAUGH, JOAN (1990µ+HLGHJJHU7DRLVPDQGWKH4XHVWLRQRI0HWDSK\VLFV¶in 
Parkes (ed.) Heidegger and Asian Thought, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 
79-92. 
 
6725(<'$9,'µ=HQLQ+HLGHJJHU¶V:D\¶Journal of East-West Thought, 2: 
4, 113-137. 
THOMSON, IAIN (2002) µ+HLGHJJHURQ2QWRORJLFDO(GXFDWLRQRU+RZ:H%HFRPH
:KDW:H$UH¶LQ3HWHUVHGHeidegger, Education, and Modernity (Oxford: Rowman 
and Littlefield) pp. 97-125. 
WOLIN, RICHARD (1993) (ed.) The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader 
(Cambridge: MIT Press) 
<$2 =+,+8$  µ7\SRORJ\ RI 1RWKLQJ +HLGHJJHU 'DRLVP DQG %XGGKLVP¶
Comparative Philosophy 1(1): 78-89 
ZHANG, SHI-<,1*µ+HLGHJJHUDQG7DRLVP¶LQ6DOOLVHGReading Heidegger: 
Commemorations (Bloomington: Indiana University Press)  
 
 
 
